THE wheel seems to be turning full circle, going by the recent interaction between India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The 3,488-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries has been subjected to frequent turbulence since India became independent in 1947 and the Chinese Communist Party wrested power in China in 1949. While India extended a friendly hand by supporting the inclusion of China as a permanent member of the Security Council and recognising Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, China responded by attacking India in 1962 and occupying Aksai Chin in Ladakh as well as some areas in Arunachal Pradesh.
Since then, China has frequently indulged in expansionism in Ladakh and Arunachal by violating the LAC. However, having experienced the Chinese perfidy, India realised that the only way to respond to the Chinese moves was to maintain a firm and active stance. Thus, Chinese aggression at Nathu La in 1967 and Sumdorong Chu in 1987 was forcefully opposed, resulting in the maintenance of the status quo. It became clear that the Chinese respected strength.
Following Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of “hide your capabilities, bide your time”, the Chinese maintained a low profile for the next two decades while building up their economic and military might. During this period, a series of agreements between India and China were signed — in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 — to ensure peace and tranquillity and recognise existing realities along the LAC.
However, as it grew stronger, the display of China’s expansionist tendencies started becoming obvious, with frequent violation of the aforesaid agreements. Thus, in 2014, the Chinese occupied Y-Junction and debarred the entry of Indian patrols to the Depsang Bulge, thereby denying approximately 1,100 sq km area for patrolling up to the Indian claim line. Likewise, Charding La access to Indian patrols near Chumar in Ladakh was denied from 2017 onwards. Additionally, a serious attempt to capture the Doklam Plateau in Bhutan was made in 2017, with the likely aim of posing a threat to the sensitive Siliguri corridor of India. The PLA design of aggressively creeping to occupy/threaten India-claimed areas emerged clearly.
Then, in 2020, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, China occupied territory north of Pangong Tso, Hot Springs and Galwan in Ladakh. The Indian Army retaliated strongly at Galwan, inflicting an undisclosed number of casualties on the PLA while suffering the loss of 20 personnel itself. Additionally, it also occupied its claimed areas on the Kailash Range. The resolute stand by the Indian forces put an effective spanner in the Chinese expansionist designs. Negotiations after the hostilities ensured partial restoration of the status quo ante in most of these areas. Since then, for the past four-and-a-half years, both sides have been in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in the area, with more than 50,000 troops deployed on either side.
Till the boundary question between the two nations is finally settled, any future dialogue must take into account lessons from the past. Trust has been the first casualty in this relationship. Time and again, China has gone back on previously concluded agreements. In an effort to increase territorial gains, it has blatantly disregarded principles agreed upon between the two. As its power has grown vis-à-vis India’s, its stance has undergone changes to exploit its strengths. A similar tendency is also visible in its interactions with littoral states of the South China Sea. This lack of trust fuels unpredictability, making contending parties wary of each other.
The collusive relationship between China and Pakistan is well known. A close nexus has developed between the two over the past 50 years. Since both harbour an adversarial stance towards India, the possibility of a two-front threat to India cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the need to tread carefully in interacting and developing ties with either can hardly be overemphasised.
Both India and China are growing economies. The space for growth at the global and regional levels is limited. Therefore, conflict is bound to arise at some stage for the dominance of that limited space. Even in a healthy competition, there are inherent seeds of confrontation, underlining the necessity for the contending parties to be vigilant.
The current decline in the Chinese growth rate is a worrisome factor for Beijing. To sustain high economic growth, China needs global markets. With the US-led West chary of China’s ambitions, measures are being put in place to shift Western production facilities from China to other nations as well as impose restrictions on the import of Chinese goods, thus denying Beijing lucrative Western markets. In such an eventuality, China would be constrained to look for markets in the Global South, where the growing Indian market is an attractive proposition. The current Chinese overtures towards India need to factor in this possibility.
At the geopolitical level, enhanced India-US cooperation in the defence sector is troubling China. With the US viewing India as a frontline state to fight Chinese expansionism, a major constraint to a closer US-India hug is the Indian policy of strategic autonomy. Chinese efforts to wean India away from the US by adopting a conciliatory approach need to be understood in this context.
The dialogue between our NSA and the Chinese Foreign Minister has only brought out an agreement on some peripheral issues without touching upon the core Indian concern of Chinese opportunism on the boundary. Some or all the above factors may have impelled China to shift from a rigid, non-negotiable stance since 2020 to accept changes in the Depsang Bulge, Charding La and Chumar areas. It is certainly not from a position of weakness. After all, China only gave way north of Pangong Tso, Hot Springs and Galwan to achieve status quo ante on the Kailash Range, where Indian Army had become dominant.
Thus, the need for a cautious and well-analysed response to the illusory Chinese move on the boundary issue is warranted. The Dragon is known to drag its feet in giving away without securing disproportionate gains. Media reports saying that China has not eased its LAC build-up, as per US sources, only confirm this hypothesis.