Military Digest: Army commanding officers who led from the front in 1965 war and died fighting

We also remember two commanding officers who were taken prisoners of war. Often in battles, certain circumstances prevail beyond the control and anticipation of the troops on the ground, causing such situations.

No list of commanding officers who died in battle in 1965 can be complete without Lt Col A B Tarapore, Param Vir Chakra (posthumous), and Lt Col N N Khanna, Maha Vir Chakra (posthumous), of Poona Horse and 1 Sikh, respectively. However, their actions are widely known and publicised and are therefore not being recounted here.

Brigadier B F Masters, Commander of 191 Infantry Brigade

On Independence Day in August 1965, Pakistani Artillery, aided by an observation post that had infiltrated earlier into India, targeted an ammunition dump at Dewa in the Chhamb sector of Jammu and Kashmir. The firing took place when the commander of 191 Infantry Brigade, Brigadier B F Masters, and his staff were visiting the dump.

The dump was blown up in the firing and Brigadier Masters was killed along with Maj Balram Singh Jamwal, 2iC 8 JAKRIF; Capt R K Chahar, GSO 3, 191 Brigade; 2/Lt Narinder Singh of 14 Field Regiment; one junior commissioned officer; and four officers of other ranks. Six guns of 14 Field Regiment were destroyed.

Lt Col S C Joshi, Central India Horse

Lt Colonel Joshi’s regiment was given the task of advancing along the Khalra-Lahore road and providing close support to 4 Sikh advancing on Barki, a heavily defended village in Pakistan’s Punjab.

Barki was captured by 4 Sikh on the night of September 10/11. The advance continued but was hampered by enemy minefields. Lt Col Joshi went forward and tried to find a detour around the enemy mines, but while doing so his tank was disabled by a mine.

In complete disregard of incessant heavy enemy shelling, Joshi walked up to Barki and obtained a jeep from 4 Sikh. Thereafter, driving the jeep, he reconnoitred a passage through the minefields onto the canal bank. However, while doing so Lt Col Joshi’s jeep was blown up by a landmine. He was seriously injured and later he died.

Lt Col Joshi was awarded a Bar to the Vir Chakra. His previous award of Vir Chakra was in the 1948 Indo-Pak war.

Lt Col H L Mehta, 4 Madras

Lt Colonel Mehta’s battalion was deployed in the Sialkot sector and was tasked to take part in the attack on Maharajke. During the attack in the early hours of September 8, he found that one of his companies was held up by heavy Pakistani machine guns, mortars and other automatic weapons.

Alternative plans to deal with the Pakistani defences by using a reserve company to attack also failed. Considering the gravity of the situation, Lt Col Mehta went forward and assumed leadership of the assault, motivating his men to press home and capture the objective. Lt Col Mehta died leading the attack and was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.

Lt Col Madan Lal Chadha, commandant of HAWS

Lt Col Chadha was commissioned in the Parachute Regiment and was the Commandant of High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) in Jammu and Kashmir when Pakistani infiltration began in August 1965.

He organised regular patrolling of the Srinagar-Leh road to prevent interdiction by Pakistanis and also reinforced defences at Sonamarg. On one occasion, Lt Col Chadha led the charge against Pakistani troops, causing six deaths among them and forcing them to flee leaving their weapons and equipment behind.

Lt Col Chadha was killed in enemy firing on August 31, when leading an ad-hoc company of HAWS consisting of trainee jawans and instructors. He was posthumously awarded the Vir Chakra.

Lt Col Mathew Manohar, 6 Maratha Light Infantry

6 Maratha Light Infantry, under the command of Lt Col A M (Mathew) Manohar, moved to its operational area in Sialkot on September 7, 1965, and went into action the same night.

According to an account written by Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd), the battalion was a part of the offensive in the Sialkot Sector and tasked with taking part in the important attack on the Pakistani town of Chawinda.

The brigade attack commenced on the night of September 8 and met with strong resistance. The battalion fought its way against heavy odds and captured its assigned objective, but it was isolated as it was the only battalion to reach the objective. Enemy armour and infantry launched several counterattacks, in which the battalion suffered heavy casualties, including Lt Col Manohar.

Lt Col T T A Nolan, 2 Maratha Light Infantry

Lt Col Terry Nolan was commanding 2 Maratha Ll in 1965 and his battalion moved to Ferozepur on September 4 to defend the important Hussainiwala headworks on the Sutlej river.

A high enemy observation tower and the Khojianwali post were captured and extensive patrolling kept the enemy on the defensive. On September 19, a major enemy attack was repulsed, although the company commander was wounded. On September 21, 1965, Lt Col Nolan was killed when an artillery shell exploded very close to him.

Lt Col V V K Nambiar, prisoner of war, 4 Maratha Light Infantry

4 Maratha Ll, under the command of Lt Col V V K Nambiar, was deployed in the Rajasthan sector. The battalion had an objective after a gruelling march in the desert and the very next day the enemy mounted a major attack the next day and surrounded the troops. A withdrawal was ordered. However, as the enemy had blocked all routes, the troops were cut off and the commanding officer, four other officers, two junior commissioned officers and 20 officers of other ranks were taken prisoners.

Lt Col Anant Singh, prison of war, 4 Sikh

4 Sikh captured Barki on September 10 under great opposition from Pakistan’s army. Known as the Saragarhi Battalion, as it drew lineage from 36 Sikh Regiment, whose 21 soldiers had made a gallant last stand at Saragarhi in North West Frontier Province in 1897, the unit was not given any time to rest after Barki.

The Army commander launched the battalion as part of an operation to re-capture Khem Karan from Pakistanis on September 12, the anniversary of the Saragarhi battle. The plan failed miserably due to inadequate reconnaissance and poor planning at the higher headquarters level. The battalion walked into captivity in substantial numbers with its commanding officers at its head.

An Indian Army officer speaking to a Pakistan Army officer driving a jeep in the Lahore sector soon after the ceasefire in 1965 war.